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Abstract
Ladyman and Ross (LR) argue that quantum objects are not indi-
viduals (or are at most weakly discernible individuals) and use this idea
to ground their metaphysical view, ontic structural realism, according
to which relational structures are primary to things. LR acknowledge
that there is a version of quantum theory, namely the Bohm theory
(BT), according to which particles do have definite trajectories at all
times. However, LR interpret the research by Brown et al. as imply-
ing that “raw stuff” or haecceities are needed for the individuality of
particles of BT, and LR dismiss this as idle metaphysics. In this paper
we note that Brown et al.’s research does not imply that haecceities
are needed. Thus BT remains as a genuine option for those who seek
to understand quantum particles as individuals. However, we go on to
discuss some problems with BT which led Bohm and Hiley to modify it.
This modified version underlines that, due to features such as context-
dependence and non-locality, Bohmian particles have a very limited
autonomy in situations where quantum effects are non-negligible. So
while BT restores the possibility of quantum individuals, it also un-
derlines the primacy of the whole over the autonomy of the parts. The
later sections of the paper also examine the Bohm theory in the gen-
eral mathematical context of symplectic geometry. This provides yet
another way of understanding the subtle, holistic and dynamic nature
of Bohmian individuals. We finally briefly consider Bohm’s other main
line of research, the ‘mplicate order”, which is in some ways similar to
LR’s structural realism.
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1 Introduction.
The usual interpretation of the quantum theory implies that we
must renounce the possibility of describing an individual system
in terms of a single, precisely defined conceptual model. We
have, however, proposed an alternative interpretation ...which
leads us to regard a quantum-mechanical system as a synthesis
of a precisely definable particle and a precisely definable ψ-field...
(Bohm 1952a: 188)
Perhaps the greatest challenge to the notion that objects are individuals
with well-defined identity conditions comes from modern quantum and rela-
tivity physics. For, ever since the early days of the quantum revolution, the
identity and individuality of quantum systems has frequently been called
into question (see e.g. French 2011 and the references therein; French and
Krause 2006; Ladyman and Ross 2007, ch 3).
Many of the founding figures of quantum theory, and most notably Niels
Bohr, held that it is not possible to describe individual quantum objects and
their behaviour in the same way as one can in classical physics, pointing out
that the individual cannot be separated from the whole experimental context
(for a recent penetrating discussion of Bohr’s views, see Plotnitsky 2010).
The idea that quantal objects might, in some sense, be “non-individuals”
was also considered early on by, for example, Born, Heisenberg and Weyl
(French 2011: 6).
One physicist who throughout his career emphasized the holistic features
of quantum phenomena was David Bohm (1917-1992). For example, in his
1951 text-book Quantum Theory which reflected the usual interpretation of
quantum theory, he characterized individual quantum objects in strongly
relational and contextual terms:
...quantum theory requires us to give up the idea that the elec-
tron, or any other object has, by itself, any intrinsic properties
at all. Instead, each object should be regarded as something
containing only incompletely defined potentialities that are de-
veloped when the object interacts with an appropriate system
(1951: 139).
However, as is well known, soon after completing his 1951 text-book,
Bohm discovered an alternative interpretation of quantum theory which
gives individuals a much stronger status than the usual interpretation. His
motivation stemmed from his dissatisfaction with the fact that the usual
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interpretation was not providing an ontology, a comprehensive view of quan-
tum reality beyond the fragmentary experimental phenomena (Bohm 1987).
Besides, discussions with Einstein in Princeton in the early 1950s strongly
inspired him to start searching for a deterministic extension of quantum
theory:
In this connection, I soon thought of the classical Hamilton-
Jacobi theory, which relates waves to particles in a fundamental
way. Indeed, it had long been known that when one makes a
certain approximation [WKB], Schro¨dinger’s equation becomes
equivalent to the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation. At a cer-
tain point, I suddenly asked myself: What would happen, in
the demonstration of this equivalence, if we did not make this
approximation? (Bohm 1987)
From the ontological point of view the puzzling thing about the WKB
approximation is that we start from Schro¨dinger’s equation, which according
to the usual interpretation does not refer to an ontology, we then remove
something from Schro¨dinger’s equation, and suddenly obtain the classical
Hamilton-Jacobi equation which refers to a classical ontology. But how can
removing something from a “non-ontology” give us an ontology? Bohm’s
insight was to realize that if one does not approximate, one can see an
unambiguous ontology that is hiding in Schro¨dinger’s equation:
I quickly saw that there would be a new potential, representing a
new kind of force, that would be acting on the particle. I called
this the quantum potential, which was designated by Q. This
gave rise immediately to what I called a causal interpretation of
the quantum theory. The basic assumption was that the electron
is a particle, acted on not only by the classical potential, V, but
also by the quantum potential, Q. This latter is determined by a
new kind of wave that satisfies Schro¨dinger’s equation. This wave
was assumed, like the particle, to be an independent actuality
that existed on its own, rather than being merely a function from
which the statistical properties of phenomena could be derived.
Q is responsible for all quantum effects (such as the interference patterns
of electrons and quantum nonlocality). However, whenever Q is negligibly
small, quantum ontology gives rise to classical ontology. In 1952 Bohm
published in Physical Review two papers that presented this interpretation
(which independently re-discovered and made more coherent a theory which
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de Broglie had presented in the 1927 Solvay conference). To see the relevance
of Bohm’s interpretation to the question of individuality in quantum theory
let us consider how he contrasts his approach with that of Bohr:
...Bohr suggests that at the atomic level we must renounce our
hitherto successful practice of conceiving of an individual system
as a unified and precisely definable whole, all of whose aspects
are, in a manner of speaking, simultaneously and unambiguously
accessible to our conceptual gaze. ... in Bohr’s point of view, the
wave function is in no sense a conceptual model of an individual
system, since it is not in a precise (one-to-one) correspondence
with the behavior of this system, but only in a statistical corre-
spondence (1952a: 167-8).
In contrast to this, Bohm’s alternative interpretation regards
...the wave function of an individual electron as a mathematical
representation of an objectively real field (1952a: 170).
Thus for Bohm, an individual quantum-mechanical system has two as-
pects:
it is a synthesis of a precisely definable particle and a precisely
definable ψ-field which exerts a force on this particle (1952b:
188).
Now, if the Bohm theory is a coherent option, it undermines the ar-
guments of those who claim that non-relativistic quantum theory somehow
forces us to give up the notion that quantum objects are individuals with
well-defined identity conditions. Ironically there is also a tension between
Bohm’s 1952 theory and much of his own other more anti-individualist (i.e.
structuralist and process-oriented) work - both before and after 1952. Given
this tension, it is not surprising that Bohm and Hiley developed Bohm’s 1952
theory further in their later research (Bohm and Hiley 1987, 1993).
The question of whether quantum particles are individuals is also raised
by the philosophers James Ladyman and Don Ross in their thought-provoking
and important book Every Thing Must Go (2007, hereafter ETMG). They
advocate the view that quantum particles are not individuals (or, at most,
are weakly discernible individuals). They acknowledge that there seem to
be individuals in the Bohm theory, but go on to refer to research by Brown
et al. (1996) which they interpret as saying that in the Bohm theory, the
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properties normally associated with particles (mass, charge, etc.) are in-
herent only in the quantum field and not in the particles. It would then
seem that there is nothing there in the trajectories unless one assumes the
existence of some “raw stuff” of the particle. In other words it seems that
haecceities are needed for the individuality of particles of the Bohm theory,
and Ladyman and Ross dismiss this as idle metaphysics.
In what follows we will first give a brief account of Ladyman and Ross’s
views on individuality in quantum mechanics (section 2). We then intro-
duce Bohm’s 1952 theory, focusing on the way it seems to have room for
quantum individuals (section 3). In section 4 we first present Ladyman and
Ross’s criticism of Bohmian individuality and then go on to challenge this
criticism. We illustrate how puzzling quantum experiments, such as the
Aharonov-Bohm effect are explained in terms of the quantum potential ap-
proach. In section 5 we show how the symplectic symmetry forms a basis
common to both classical and quantum motion and in section 6 bring out
its relevance to the question of quantum individuality. In section 7 we show
how some of the problems with the 1952 Bohm theory can be resolved by the
radical proposal that the quantum potential functions as active information.
We also note that while the Bohm theory allows us to retain the notion of
individual particles, such particles have only a limited autonomy. In section
8 we briefly consider Bohm’s other main line of research (the “implicate
order”) which emphasizes the primacy of structure and process over indi-
vidual objects. This research further underlines that while individuals have
relative autonomy in Bohm’s approach, they are not fundamental. Thus, in
a broad sense, Bohm and Hiley’s approach to quantum theory has interest-
ing similarities to Ladyman and Ross’s structural realism, even though the
former gives quantum individuals a stronger status than the latter.
2 Ladyman and Ross on individuality in quantum
mechanics.
In the third chapter of ETMG, Ladyman and Ross discuss identity and in-
dividuality in quantum mechanics. Following French and Redhead (1988),
they first establish that indistinguishable elementary particles, that is par-
ticles that have the same mass, charge etc., behave differently in quantum
mechanics than they do in classical statistical mechanics. For quantum
particles an “indistinguishability postulate” states that a permutation of in-
distinguishable particles is not observable and thus those states which differ
only by a permutation of such particles are treated as the same state with a
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different labeling. This might point to the view that quantum particles are
not individuals.
Individuality is however an ontological property whereas (in)distinguishability
is an epistemic one. So how are these two related? Ladyman and Ross iden-
tify three candidates in the philosophical tradition for individuality:
1. transcendent individuality: the individuality of something is a feature
of it over and above all its qualitative properties;
2. spatio-temporal location or trajectory;
3. all or some restricted set of their properties (the bundle theory) (ETMG,
p. 134).
#1 above is ruled out because it involves haecceities, and thus involves
what Ladyman and Ross would consider idle metaphysical speculation. Grant-
ing this restriction for the sake of the argument, the interesting candidates
are #2 and #3
A connection between individuality and distinguishability is given by
the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII), which can be taken
roughly to state that no two objects have exactly the same properties. It
is easy to see that everyday objects satisfy both #2 and #3, while the
point particles of classical mechanics satisfy #2. Then for both everyday
objects and particles of classical mechanics PII is true and individuality and
distinguishability can be taken to be the same thing. However, for certain
quantum systems neither #2 nor #3 seems to hold. Ladyman and Ross
take as an example of such a state the singlet state of two electrons orbiting
a helium atom:
ψ = 1/
√
2[| ↑〉1| ↓〉2 − | ↓〉1| ↑〉2)] (1)
Here any property that can be ascribed to particle 1 can also be ascribed
to particle 2. So in this state the two electrons share all their extrinsic and
intrinsic properties, thus falling foul of both #2 and #3. So it would seem
that quantum particles are not individuals.
However, this conclusion might follow from a too strict a notion of dis-
cernibility. Following Saunders (2003a, 2003b, 2006), Ladyman and Ross
give three notions of discernibility:
(i) absolute discernibility
(ii) relative discernibility and
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(iii) weak discernibility.
These can be defined as follows (ETMG, p 137):
(i) “Two objects are absolutely discernible if there exists a formula in one
variable which is true of one object and not the other”. This holds for
ordinary everyday objects.
(ii) “Two objects are relatively discernible just in case there is a formula
in two free variables which applies to them in one order only. ...[T]he
points of a one-dimensional space with an ordering relation, since, for
any such pair of points x and y, if they are not the same point then
either x > y or x < y but not both”.
(iii) “Two objects are weakly discernible just in case there is two-place
irreflexive relation that they satisfy.” The Fermions in a singlet state
are discernible in this sense, as they satisfy the relation ‘is of opposite
spin to’.
Now since electrons in the singlet state are discernible they can be viewed
as individuals. But they are weakly discernible. This is a thoroughly struc-
turalist view “...as individuals are nothing over and above the nexus of
relations in which they stand.” (ETMG, p. 138.)
3 The Bohm theory
Now let us turn to consider how the Bohm theory deals with these situations.
Starting from the Schro¨dinger equation, we find the real part can be written
as
∂S
∂t
+
1
2m
(∇S)2 +Q+ V = 0 (2)
under a polar decomposition of the wave function ψ(r, t) = R(r, t) exp[iS(r, t)/~].
This equation has a similar form to the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation
except for the appearance of a new term
Q = − ~
2
2m
∇2R
R
(3)
which is known as the quantum potential. Of course this means identifying
the momentum of the particle by p = ∇S where S is the phase of the wave
function. This relation, also known in some versions of this approach as the
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‘guidance condition’, enables the trajectory of the particle to be calculated.
Note that the so called “Bohmian mechanics” approach to Bohm’s theory
emphasizes that we get a deterministic particle mechanics directly from the
first-order guidance equation involving the velocities of the particles (see
Goldstein 2013). However, in this paper we will be focusing on the way the
Bohm theory arises from the above Hamilton-Jacobi type equation.
Figures 1 and 2 provide well-known visualizations.
Figure 1: Trajectories for two Gaussian slits
Figure 2: Quantum potential for two Gaussian slits
So there is a version of quantum theory (the Bohm theory) according to
which each particle has a definite and distinct trajectory at all times. This
suggests that quantum particles are individuals, with position being the
property in virtue of which particles are always different from one another.
The biggest problem for retaining the notion of individuality is particles
in entangled states described by equation (1). This is an entangled spin
state which has been discussed in detail by Dewdney, Holland, Kyprianidis
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and Vigier (1988), but for our purposes here it is sufficient to consider a gen-
eral two-body wave function, ψ(r1, r2, t) and use the two-body Schro¨dinger
equation to find
∂S
∂t
+
(∇1S)2
2m1
+
(∇2S)2
2m2
+Q(r1, r2, t) + V (r1, r2) = 0 (4)
The second and third terms in this equation correspond to the kinetic en-
ergies of each particle so once again the problem of individuality does not
seem to arise in the Bohm theory. The entanglement is reflected in the
non-local quantum potential energy term Q(r1, r2, t). Furthermore since
the trajectories do not cross, we follow Brown, Sjo¨qvist and Bacciagaluppi
(1999: 233) and conclude that indistinguishable fermions will always have
distinct trajectories (for further discussion see French 2011: 14-15; French
and Krause 2006: 178). Thus individuality is preserved.
4 The Bohm theory and haecceities
So the Bohm theory seems to suggest, contra Ladyman and Ross, that quan-
tum particles can be individuals in a stronger sense than they claim. They
do acknowledge the existence of the Bohm theory in a footnote, but do not
see it as a problem for their non-individualistic view. They write:
Of course, there is a version of quantum theory, namely Bohm
theory, according to which QM is not complete and particles do
have definite trajectories at all times. However, Harvey Brown
et al. (1996) argue that the ‘particles’ of Bohm theory are not
those of classical mechanics. The dynamics of the theory are
such that the properties, like mass, charge, and so on, normally
associated with particles are in fact inherent in the quantum
field and not in the particles. It seems that the particles only
have position. We may be happy that trajectories are enough to
individuate particles in Bohm theory, but what will distinguish
an ‘empty’ trajectory from an ‘occupied’ one? Since none of the
physical properties ascribed to the particle will actually inhere
in points of the trajectory, giving content to the claim that there
is actually a ‘particle’ there would seem to require some notion
of the raw stuff of the particle; in other words haecceities seem
to be needed for the individuality of particles of Bohm theory
too. (ETMG, p. 136 fn.)
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Actually, Ladyman and Ross are somewhat one-sided in their reporting of
the views of Brown, Elby and Weingard (1996). For in their paper Brown
et al. are not arguing for the view that in the Bohm theory, properties
like mass, charge, and so on, normally associated with particles are only
inherent in the ψ-field and not in the particles. What they do argue for
is that certain experiments (for example, certain types of interferometry
experiments) rule out the possibility that these properties are associated
with the Bohm particle alone.
They point out that there are two principles we can adopt here. Firstly,
there is the principle of generosity, according to which the properties can be
attributed to both the ψ-field and the particle. Secondly, there is the princi-
ple of parsimony according to which properties such as mass are attributes
not of the particle but of the ψ-field alone. They do not take a definite
stand on which principle we should adopt. However, they draw attention
to reasons to adopt the principle of generosity, while at the same time indi-
cating difficulties inherent in the principe of parsimony. It thus seems clear
that, contra what Ladyman and Ross suggest, they are more in favor of the
principle of generosity. To be fair, however, we should acknowledge that
the issue is subtle and people’s views on this vary– it seems that Harvey
Brown himself was in favor of parsimony before opting for generosity. For
Brown et al. (1996) acknowledge that the principle of parsimony is implicit
in Brown’s earlier work; they also note that it is implied by some of Bell’s
suggestions (Bell 1990, 30).
Let us now examine in more detail the arguments which suggest that
properties such as mass or charge are not inherent only in the particles.
In order to bring the issue into focus Brown, Dewdney and Horton (1995)
introduce and define the localized particle properties thesis (LPP): particle
properties (such as mass, charge etc.) are attributes of the particle rather
than the ψ-field. That is the mass, say, of the particle is localized at the
position of the particle at all times. They go on to point out that several
experiments seem to violate the LPP.
In the neutron interferometry experiments of Colella, Overhauser and
Werner (1975), a neutron stream travels through a beam splitter along two
routes, producing an interference pattern. Now, if the apparatus is tilted in
such a way that one of the routes has a higher gravitational potential than
the other, the interference pattern is shifted. According to the Bohm theory
the particle travels one of the paths while the ψ-field travels both paths.
Brown et al. note that if we assume that all of the electron’s gravitational
mass is concentrated in the path where the particle is, it becomes difficult
to understand intuitively why the interference pattern is shifted. For if the
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empty path ψ-field carries no gravitational mass, how could the difference
in the gravitational potential integrated over the two paths be felt by the
particle? So they argue that for gravitational mass, the LPP seems to be
violated.
According to Bohm and Hiley the particle and the ψ-field are strictly
speaking indivisible. However we can think of them as two different aspects
of an underlying whole. Now, there seems to be no inherent reason in such
ontology that, say, the mass should be entirely localized with the particles.
Indeed the mathematics suggests that mass is implicated in both the particle
and the field aspect. For mass appears both in the mathematical expression
of the kinetic energy of the particle and in the mathematical expression of
the quantum potential which reflects the ψ-field. This is in harmony with
the principle of generosity, i.e. it seems that mass resides in both the particle
aspect and in the field aspect of the individual system.
In the Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect a similar situation arises with charge.
In the AB effect the normal two-slit experimental arrangement has in the
geometrical shadow of the two slits a shielded region containing a magnetic
field. The shield is such that the electrons cannot experience the magnetic
field directly at all. Nevertheless one finds that the interference pattern is
shifted by an amount that depends on the strength of the magnetic flux in
the shielded region. Since the electrons do not experience this flux directly
it is difficult to understand why the interference pattern is changed. Indeed,
Brown, Sjo¨qvist and Bacciagaluppi write (1999, p. 234 fn):
The expression for the phase shift due to the flux in the shielded
solenoid depends on the electrons charge being present on spatial
loops within the support of the wave function and enclosing the
solenoid.
But again the trajectory of the Bohmian particle associated with the charged
particle does not encircle the solenoid. So the LPP seems to be violated for
charge.
The AB effect has been numerically analyzed in terms of the Bohm
theory by Philippidis, Bohm and Kaye (1982). This analysis shows that in
the AB effect, the vector potential (from which the magnetic line of flux is
derived) affects the phase of the wave function in such a way that the latter
gives rise to an asymmetric quantum potential.
If we compare this QPE with that shown in figure 2, where no magnetic
line of flux is present, we see that the pattern of the quantum potential
has been shifted off the axis of symmetry by an amount that depends on
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Figure 3: The quantum potential for the Aharonov-Bohm effect. Notice the
asymmetrical shift
the strength of the enclosed flux. This, in turn, produces a shift in the
ensemble of trajectories as was shown in Philippidis, Bohm and Kaye (1982).
This results in an overall pattern shift which has actually been observed in
experiment (see Bayh (1962)). As with the gravitational example, it is
reasonable to assume that the charge inheres both in the particle and the
wave (see Bohm and Hiley 1993: 52-54 for more details).
5 Symplectic symmetry as the common basis of
classical and quantum dynamics
There has been a common misconception that the use of the quantum poten-
tial implies a return to the classical paradigm and that quantum mechanics
is a radical departure, so radical that any elements of the classical paradigm
must be avoided at all costs. Indeed the way that the quantum Hamilton-
Jacobi equation (2) is derived hides a much deeper relation between classical
and quantum dynamics. Mathematically they have a common kinematic
symmetry, namely, the symplectic group of transformations. As Melvin
Brown (2006: v) has succinctly put it,
[t]his very general group of transformations maintains the fun-
damental relationship between position and momentum in me-
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chanics, and its covering group (the metaplectic group) corre-
spondingly transforms the wave function in quantum mechanics.
Assuming that the reader may not be familiar with the mathematics of
covering groups, we will here approach the subject in a non-formal way (for
a more technical presentation, see e.g. de Gosson 2001; Brown 2006).
To bring out this deeper connection, let us return to examine the moti-
vations that led Schro¨dinger to his equation. When the wave properties of
electrons and atoms had been established, Schro¨dinger recalled Hamilton’s
discussions on the relation between ray optics and wave optics. Hamilton
had shown that paraxial optical rays could be described by the same pair
of dynamical equations that he had proposed for classical particles and was
attempting to generalise these to capture the wave properties of light. (See
Guillemin and Sternberg 1984 for more details.) What the Hamilton-Jacobi
theory had shown was that the rays (classical particle trajectories) were per-
pendicular to a set of surfaces of constant action S. Although the action is
well defined mathematically, namely, S = p.x−Et, its physical meaning was
not clear. Schro¨dinger noticed that if we could regard these surfaces as sur-
faces of constant phase, then perhaps, we could find an equation that would
form the basis of what he called “Hamiltonian undulatory mechanics”.
Schro¨dinger’s arguments to derive his equation were, at best, heuristic.
Even Schro¨dinger (1926) himself writes “I realise that this formulation is
not quite unambiguous”. But this should not be surprising as the necessary
mathematics of the geometry that underlies both classical and quantum
dynamics did not exist the 1920s.
However the equation quickly gave results that agreed with experiment,
so that the equation was taken as an a posteriori given, independent of
its origins. It became the defining equation of quantum phenomena and
as a consequence of trying to understand this equation, the ‘wave func-
tion’ became the centre of attention (this attention continues to the present
day, see e.g. Albert and Ney ed. 2013). With this position came the
paradoxes of quantum theory that remain unresolved. Relatively few physi-
cists or philosophers have attempted a sustained exploration of the deeper
mathematical background from which the equation appears. Indeed the
Schro¨dinger equation is taken as a given, arising as if by magic. Even Feyn-
man (1963) acknowledged that the equation was not derived from anything
known in physics or mathematics. As he remarked: “It came out of the
mind of Schro¨dinger”.
The connection between classical and quantum dynamics begins to emerge
as we examine the common symmetry, the symplectic symmetry, underlying
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both Hamiltonian dynamics and the Schro¨dinger dynamics (de Gosson 2001
and 2010). These deeper connections have emerged relatively recently in
the mathematics literature and are just beginning to become appreciated
by the physics community. What one learns is that classical mechanics and
ray optics emerge at the level of the symplectic group of transformations
itself, but wave theory and quantum mechanics begin to emerge at a higher
level, namely in the double cover of the group, i.e. the metaplectic group
and its generalisation. The “double” here means, roughly, that there are
always two elements in the metaplectic group representing one element in
the symplectic group.
The importance of the double cover is a vital part of quantum mechanics,
since it enables one to capture global properties of the type that occur in
our discussion of the AB effect. These global properties play a significant
role in Bohm’s notion of “unbroken wholeness” which we will discuss in a
later section.
We are already very familiar with this idea of a double cover in the
case of rotational symmetry. Here the double cover is the spin group. This
gives us the spinor with which we describe fermions and these spinors form
the mathematical basis of the entangled singlet state given by equation (1)
above. Furthermore it is the relation between the group and its double cover
that gives us a mathematical description of the experimentally confirmed
difference between a 2pi and a 4pi rotation that shows up in experiments
with fermions (see Werner et al. 1975).
This is not the place to go into mathematical details and we will simply
point out some interesting results to bring out the unexpected connection
between classical and quantum mechanics. Firstly de Gosson and Hiley
(2011) have shown that if we formally “lift” a Hamiltonian flow onto the
double cover space, we find a unique flow in this covering space and this flow
satisfies a Schro¨dinger-like equation, confirming the results in Guillemin and
Sternberg (1984). It is ‘Schro¨dinger-like’ because at this stage it contains an
arbitrary parameter with dimensions of action to enable us to put position
and momentum on the same footing. The mathematics alone does not enable
us to identify this parameter with Planck’s constant. Its value is determined
by experiment as it is in the standard theory.
Secondly de Gosson (2010) draws attention to a deep topological theo-
rem in symplectic geometry known as the ‘Gromov no-squeezing’ theorem.
This states that even in classical mechanics, it is not possible to reduce
a canonical volume such as ∆x∆p by means of a Hamiltonian flow alone.
When this region is lifted into the covering space it provides the source of
the uncertainty principle. In this way one can say that the symplectic fea-
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tures of the classical world contain the footprint of the uncertainty principle
even at the classical level. This structure provides a rigorous mathematical
background for Schro¨dinger’s ‘undulatory mechanics’.
6 Bohmian quantum individuals in the light of the
metaplectic group of transformations
We cannot go into the mathematical details here, nevertheless we feel it is
necessary to explain some aspects that emerge from the details. Since we
want to focus on the relationship between the action surfaces and phase
surfaces, it is convenient to describe the dynamical evolution in terms of a
notion of a flow. For classical particles, the Hamilton flow is in phase space
z(t′) = ft′,tz(t)
where z(t) = (x(t), p(t)) are the coordinates of the particles in the phase
space. The Schro¨dinger flow is
ψ(t′) = Ft′,tψ(t)
where ψ(x, t) = (R(x, t), S(x, t)). In each case the flow is determined by
the Hamiltonian. By focussing on the flow, we have a different way of
understanding the relationship between the two types of behaviour.
We can illustrate how the flow determines the behaviour of the individ-
ual by re-examining the AB effect. Here the flow must reflect the difference
between those paths that encircle the enclosed flux and those that do not.
What this means is that the Schro¨dinger flow itself is a global flow, not a
local flow. In order to access the relevant global properties of the environ-
ment, the flow must carry the information about the global properties of the
environment, which is encoded in the covering group. When we examine the
effect of this covering group in the underlying group we find that the energy
associated with the particle splits into two parts
Eparticle =
(∇S)2
2m
− ~
2
2m
∇2R
R
= KE +QPE.
In this sense the QPE is not the source of a force acting on the particle.
Rather it is a potentiality for the behaviour of the particle-like process that
finds itself at a particular region in space (this may be somewhat similar to
the ideas of Esfeld et al. (2013) who consider the prospects of grounding
the motions of particles in dispositions in the Bohm theory).
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The splitting of the energy of the individual is not mere speculation as
experiments using weak measurements are in progress to measure these parts
(Flack and Hiley 2014). In view of this radical possibility let us look at the
role of the individual in a different way. Recall that Hamilton considered the
optic ray as the locus of some invariant independent and indivisible feature
of the energy flow, namely the the wave-packet that we now call the photon.
When we apply the same idea to the Schro¨dinger particle, we can regard the
‘trajectory’ as the locus of some indivisible but not necessary localised energy
which we call the ‘particle’. In the case of the photon it is not possible to
slow it down or give it a precise position so the notion of a ‘photon trajectory’
is questionable. On the other hand for the quantum particle, it is possible
to slow it down and examine it in the classical limit, and show it becomes
a point-like object. Such a situation arises whenever the quantum potential
energy (QPE) is small compared with classical energy.
Hiley and Mufti (1995) have given a simple model that nicely illustrates
this feature. Suppose we have a situation in which the quantum potential
is time dependent and becomes smaller as time progresses. One can then
show that the ensemble of quantum trajectories merge smoothly into an
ensemble of classical trajectories. Thus a particle following a trajectory in
the quantum domain will become a particle obeying the rules expected of a
classical particle. In our view these results present strong evidence that it
is a coherent possibility that a particle keeps its identity and individuality
in a quantum context, even though some of its energy is now involved in
exploring its environmental neighbourhood via the ψ-field producing the
associated QPE.
The radically different nature of individuality in the quantum domain
appears when two or more particles become ‘entangled’ as illustrated in
equation (1). In the Bohm approach these particles are coupled by a common
quantum potential energy. This potential is non-local in the sense that the
behaviour of one particle is ‘locked’ into the behaviour of the other. This
gives a time evolution that involves the two spatially separated particles
behaving as a single entity. An example of such an object is the Cooper
pair, the electron pair responsible for superconductivity. It is tempting to
see such an entity as new type of individual, where we find a “twoness” in an
underlying individual whole. This is in contrast to two particles described by
a product of two wave functions, which can be seen as separate individuals.
If we return to examine the details of the pair of particles described by
equation (1), we find an ensemble of correlated trajectories which have been
calculated by Dewdney et al. (1986, 1987, 1988). There we see that if one of
the particles enters the field of a Stern-Gerlach magnet, it is then deflected
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either ‘up’ or ‘down’ depending on the positions of each particle at the time
just before the particle enters the magnetic field. The particle in the field
has its trajectories changed while the other particle continues in a straight
line. At the same time both spin components become well defined. This is a
surprising result, but shows quite clearly that the individual parts cannot be
thought of as isolated ‘little spinning spheres’, a point that was emphasised
by Weyl (1931).
In the AB situation, an ensemble of incident particles would then give rise
to a shifted interference pattern, the shift being determined by the enclosed
magnetic flux. Nowhere do we lose the identity of the individual particle even
though it is responding to a global situation. This notion of individuality
is strengthened when it is realised that if the particle were not charged,
then its Schro¨dinger evolution would be very different and the interference
pattern would be unaffected by the presence of any enclosed magnetic line
of flux. In this sense the quantum potential energy is a ‘private’ energy; it
is ‘individual’ in the sense of belonging to the individual particle. This is
why on detection the particle reveals its total energy.
Note that this is an example where quantum theory seems to involve
stronger and more peculiar individuality than classical physics! This point
is often left unnoticed in discussions of individuality in the quantum theory
where one typically emphasizes the non-individualistic aspects of the quan-
tum domain. Note in particular that if two particles are conventionally de-
scribed by a product of two wave functions and the particles do not interact
through a classical potential, they do not experience each others quantum
potential even though they may both be in a region of space where their
wave functions have significant spatial overlap (see Brown et al.1996: 313-4).
7 Problems with the Bohm theory and their solu-
tion via the hypothesis of active information
Bohm was not entirely happy with his 1952 theory, and in his 1957 book
Causality and Chance in Modern Physics, as well as in a 1962 article (re-
published in Bohm 1980) he summarized his criticisms. Firstly, he admitted
that the form of the quantum potential is “strange and arbitrary” and that
unlike, say, the electromagnetic field, it has no visible source. He added that
while the theory is logically consistent, the quantum potential should be seen
as “at best a schematic representation of some more plausible physical idea
to which we hope to advance later, as we develop the theory further” (Bohm
1980: 102). He also pointed out that for the many-body system the wave-
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function lives in a 3N-dimensional configuration space (where N is the num-
ber of particles). It is difficult to understand what such a multi-dimensional
ψ-field means from a physical point of view (this is a common traditional
criticism of the de Broglie-Bohm approach, see e.g. Putnam 1965).
One way of responding to these problems is an approach to Bohm theory
that has become known as “Bohmian mechanics” which we briefly mentioned
above. Here one can say that the positions of particles are the “primitive
ontology”. What, then, is the wave function? Goldstein and Zanghi (2013)
propose that we consider the wave function as nomological, something more
in the nature of a law than a concrete physical reality. So if the wave function
does not describe a physical field, the question of the 3N-dimensional field
for the many-body system does not arise. However, we believe that quantum
potential approach enables us to explore the ontological meaning of quantum
theory in a deeper way, so let us consider whether it is possible to make this
approach physically more viable.
Remember the two worries: the form of the quantum potential is strange
and arbitrary, and it is difficult to give a physical interpretation to a multi-
dimensional ψ-field. When Bohm re-examined his 1952 theory in the late
1970s he realized that the quantum potential might be telling us something
radically new about the nature of reality. For he noticed that the quantum
potential depends only upon the form, or the second spatial derivative of
the amplitude R of the ψ-field. This form, in turn, reflects the form of the
environment (such as the presence of slits, but also features such as magnetic
flux lines and differences in gravitational potential).
Could it be that the ψ-field is literally “in-forming” or putting form
into the activity of the particle, rather than pushing and pulling the latter
mechanically? Bohm called such information “active information”, because
this is an instance where information acts to bring about changes in the
behaviour of the particle. Note also that this idea of the ψ-field as a field
that encodes information provides a new way of understanding the multi-
dimensionality of the ψ-field for the many-body system. Indeed, Bohm
suggested that the wave function describes not a multidimensional field, but
rather an information structure that can quite naturally be considered to
be multidimensional, i.e., organized into as many sets of dimensions as may
be needed. Thus the quantum wave field is not regarded as a simple source
of a mechanical force. He speculated that the information encoded in the
quantum potential is carried in some much more subtle level of matter and
energy which has not yet manifested in physical research (see Bohm and
Hiley 1987: 336). Note that the two key anomalies of the 1952 theory (i.e.,
the arbitrary form of Q and the multidimensionality of the many-body ψ-
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field) thus became the corner stones of a new interpretation of the ψ-field
as a field of information (Pylkka¨nen 1993).
Let us next consider the individuality of Bohmian particles in the light
of this active information approach. First of all, Bohm and Hiley were led
to propose that, say, an electron has an internal structure which enables
it to respond to the information in the ψ-field. So, according to this view
Bohmian quantum particles are not the point particles of classical physics,
but much more subtle entities. Note also that because of the holistic features
of the quantum potential, these particles have only a relative autonomy. In
the case of a single particle, because the quantum potential only depends
upon the form of the ψ-field, it does not necessarily fall off with distance
even if the intensity of the ψ-field becomes weak as the field spreads out.
This means that even very distant features of the environment (e.g. slits)
can have a strong effect upon the particle, thus underlining the lack of its
autonomy. Strictly speaking the entire experiment has to be treated as an
undivided whole, which is reminiscent of Bohr’s view. However, while Bohr
suggested that this whole is unanalyzable, in the Bohm theory one can now
analyze it in thought in terms of the movement of the particle acted on by
the quantum potential.
In the two-body system the autonomy of the individual becomes weaker
still, for the quantum potential depends on the position of both particles in
a way that does not necessarily fall off with the distance. This means that
there is the possibility of a non-local interaction between the two particles.
We can generalize this to the N-body system where the behaviour of each
particle may depend non-locally on all the others, no matter how far away
they may be. Non-locality is an important new feature of the quantum
theory, but Bohm used to emphasize that there is yet another feature that
is even more radical. For in the Bohm theory there can be a non-local
connection between particles that depends on the quantum state of the
whole, in a way that cannot be expressed in terms of the relationships of the
particles alone. This quantum state of the whole, described by the many-
body wave function, evolves in time according to the Schro¨dinger equation,
which led Bohm and Hiley to write:
Something with this sort of independent dynamical significance
that refers to the whole system and that is not reducible to a
property of the parts and their inter-relationships is thus playing
a key role in the theory. ... this is the most fundamental new
ontological feature implied by quantum theory. (Bohm and Hiley
1987: 332)
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The above quote reveals the holistic character of Bohm’s interpretation
of quantum theory. Even if his 1952 theory in a sense rediscovered the lost
individuality of quantum objects, his quantum ontology was not a return to
the individuals of classical physics. He thought that quantum theory was
primarily about dynamical wholeness that is not reducible to the interac-
tions between individuals. As Max Jammer has pointed out, this means
that the individuals are not “constitutive” to the whole but rather depend
on the state of the whole (1988: 696). Related to this, Tim Maudlin has
commented:
David Bohm has long contended that what is radically new about
the quantum theory is the “undivided wholeness” that it posits,
and if Bohm is right, philosophical commentaries on the quantum
theory have long been preoccupied with the wrong features of the
theory. (1998: 49)
What is also relevant here for the present volume is that the wholeness of
Bohmian quantum systems seems analogous to the organic unity of biological
systems, suggesting interesting links between physics and biology:
...the quantum potential arising under certain conditions has the
novel quality of being able to organize the activity of an entire
set of particles in a way that depends directly on the state of the
whole. Evidently, such an organization can be carried to higher
and higher levels and eventually may become relevant to living
beings. (Bohm and Hiley 1987: 332)
The quantum potential approach thus provides potentially useful tools
for a holistic approach in biology. There seems to be at least an analogy in
the way the whole and the part are related in some quantum phenomena
and some biological phenomena.
Our discussion above suggests a richer view of Bohmian particles than is
presupposed by Ladyman and Ross, or Brown et al. Indeed, Bohm proposed
that it is plausible that the behaviour and structure of matter does not
always become simpler as we go to lower dimensions. Radically, he suggested
that a particle such as an electron may have a structure (somewhere between
10-16 cm and 10-33 cm). This structure is assumed to be complex and subtle
enough to respond to the information described by the wave function. So
according to this hypothesis, there is definitely more to the individuality of
Bohmian particles than mere haecceities.
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8 Bohm’s scientific structuralism
We have seen above that while the 1952 Bohm theory in a sense rediscov-
ered the quantum individuals and particle trajectories that got lost in the
usual interpretation, the theory should by no means be seen as a return to
a mechanistic ontology where individuals are fundamental and constitutive
to the whole. Bohm’s other main line of research, known as the “implicate
order”, likewise sees quantum theory as a guide towards a conception of a
new holistic and dynamic order in physics (Jammer 1988: 696). This work
which begins to develop in the early 1960s, aims to develop a deeper un-
derlying theory from which quantum theory and relativity can be derived
as approximations, and their relation thus understood. This framework
suggests a strongly structuralist, process-oriented way of understanding in-
dividual quantum systems which is in some ways similar to Ladyman and
Ross’s structural realism. At an early phase of this work Bohm wrote:
In this theory ... the notion of a separately existing entity sim-
ply does not arise. Each entity is conceptually abstracted from
a totality of process... with the electron, what actually exists is
a structure of underlying elementary processes or linkages sup-
porting a pattern corresponding to an electron. (1965a: 291).
In the later implicate order view, an electron is not a little billiard ball that
persists and moves, but should more fundamentally be understood as
...a recurrent stable order of unfoldment in which a certain form
undergoing regular changes manifests again and again, but so
rapidly, that it appears to be in continuous existence (Bohm
1980: 194).
Finally, in the final chapter of their 1993 book Undivided Universe Bohm
and Hiley, when discussing quantum field theory and emphasizing the on-
tological primacy of movement required by relativity, summarize this non-
individualistic line of thought as follows:
...the essential qualities of fields exist only in their movement
[...] The notion of a permanently extant entity with a given
identity, whether this be a particle or anything else, is ... at best
an approximation holding only in suitable limiting cases. (1993:
357).
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Thus much of Bohm’s work supports the idea that individuals are not meta-
physically fundamental in the light of contemporary physics. His emphasis
on notions such as “structural process” (1965b), “order” and “movement”
(1980) as fundamental in physics suggests that the philosophical home of
Bohm (and Hiley’s) more general approach to physics might well be found
in some form of scientific structuralism which takes movement as funda-
mental, rather than in a metaphysics which takes individuals as basic (cf.
Ladyman and Ross 2007). Indeed, Hiley’s recent work on symplectic ge-
ometry can be seen as bringing Bohm’s 1952 approach closer to scientific
structuralism. For ultimately Hiley’ s work leads to the algebraic approach
that was initiated by Bohm and Hiley (1993, ch 15).
9 Concluding remarks.
We have above shown that the prospects of individuality in the Bohm theory
are stronger than Ladyman and Ross imply. This suggests that there is an
underdetermination of metaphysics by physics in non-relativistic quantum
theory when it comes to the question of individuality (as indeed has been
emphasized by French and Krause 2006: 189-197). However, it is important
to realize that the notion of an individual in the Bohm theory - especially
in Bohm and Hiley’s (1987, 1993) developed account of it - is very different
from what we would expect from the classical perspective. For although the
Bohmian quantum individual has a well defined energy, that energy is not a
local energy. This is consistent with Niels Bohr’s views in two ways. Firstly,
as emphasized in Bohm and Hiley (1993), the particle is never separated from
the quantum field. It is an invariant feature of the total underlying process.
This is consistent with Bohr’s notion of the “impossibility of subdividing
quantum phenomena” in the sense that the whole experimental arrangement
must be taken into account (Bohr 1958:50-51).
Secondly, we have suggested that the Bohmian individual is not a lo-
calised point-like object. As Bohr remarks (1958:73) the quantum process
is a “closed indivisible phenomenon”. The energy is not localised at a point.
In fact complementarity can be taken to imply that energy transcends space-
time. Nevertheless there is a centre of energy, a generalisation of the centre
of mass which can be given a position in space-time. It is this particle-like
centre that moves with the Bohm momentum.
These ideas are not consistent with a classical notion of a particle and
we feel can only be given a more comprehensive meaning in terms of some-
thing like Bohm’s (1965b) notion of “structural process”. Thus the over-
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all Bohmian approach to physics does not, from the metaphysical point of
view, mean a return to the individuals of classical physics, but has instead
strongly structuralist features. In particular, we noted that Bohm and Hiley
have since the 1960s been developing a broader scheme they call “the impli-
cate order”, which goes beyond the 1952 Bohm theory (Bohm 1980; Bohm
and Hiley 1993: ch15; Hiley 2011; Pylkka¨nen 2007; for Bohm’s own attempt
to reconcile ”hidden variables” and the implicate order, see his 1987). We
acknowledge that this scheme seems to have some relevant similarities to
Ladyman and Ross’s ontic structural realism, while there also may be some
significant differences. The discussion of these similarities and differences
will, however, be a subject of another study (some preliminary attempts
have already been made by Pa¨ttiniemi 2011 and Pylkka¨nen 2012).
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